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Abstract 
The whole process of reliability prediction for 
process plant rests on cortain assumptions about the way 
components and process plant behave. It is important to 
check if these assumptions hold in practice. In some 
cases they do not. Where the assumptions do not hold, 
the normal procedures of failure mode analysis and fault 
tree analysis nust be modified and supplement. Some of 
the more important assumptions are discussed. 
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SOW ASSOHFTICRS UMBKIJIHG HKLIABILITI PREDICTIOH 
J.R. Taylor - ABC Rise 
The whole process of reliability prediction for process plant rests on 
certain assumptions about the way components and process plant behaTe. It is 
important to check if these assumptions hold in practice. In some cases they 
do not. Where the assumptions do not hold, the noraal procedures of failure 
•ode analysis and fault tree analysis aust be Modified and supplemented. Sone 
of the sore important assumptions are discussed here. 
Assumption: All important modes and combinations of failure can be predicted 
and evaluated. 
Problem 1 In practice there is a problem, for large process plants, because 
of the lrrge number of combinations of failures involved. It is 
a common practice in fault tree analysis to ignore combinations 
which involve more than three or four failures, on the grounds 
that these combinations are improbable. But in practice, incidents 
with up to nine independent failures have been observed. Fig. 1 
shows a histogram of multi failure incidents described in nuclear 
reactor abnormal occurrence reports, and shows that four fold, 
five fold, and six fold failures are significant. The problem 
is in some cases even more significant, since multiple failures 
tend to have relatively more serious consequences. 
Partial solution: Bvent tree and causes consequence analysis techniques reduce 
the problem, by dividing fault trees up into stages. At each 
stage in a process, only a few combinations of failures are rel-
evant, because only a few components are involved. Using cause 
consequence analysis many combinations of failures can t-e elim-
inated, either because they are v?ry unlikely, or because they 
art impOMiblt. For example, in a relatively short batch process, 
it is often impossible to start the process unless safety equip-
ment is working. In this case, the probability of failure of the 
safety equipment la a later stage of the process is low, because 
of the short time available for failure. Attention can therefore 
be concentrated on combinations of failures in equipment which 
is not cheeked at the start of the proces«. 
-2-
Problem Z It may be difficult to discorer rare failure modes. 
This problem becomes particularly iaportant if the rare failure 
nodes affect several pieces of equipment simultaneously, or if 
they start a cascade of failures in other equipment. In such 
cases, it becomes important to discover such rare failure modes. 
Partial solutions One solution to this problem is to collect a catalogue of 
failure modes for all types of equipment. Then when a particular 
component is analysed, all the failure modes which have occurred 
in similar equipment are investigated, even if the failure modes 
have never been observed in the particular type of equipment be-
ing used. 
Another solution is to collect statistical data on higher level 
groupings of components. For example, with a diesel generator, 
it may be very difficult to investigate all kinds of failure in 
fuel supply piping, starter motors, cooling systems, etcetera. 
But if adequate failure data can be collected for diesel gener-
ator systems as a whole unit, these problems are short cix'mited. 
JBven if some rare failure mode occurs which has never been ob-
served before, it will not be significant compared with other 
failure modes. 
These are only partial solutions, because there are problems such 
ae wiring errors, flooding, fire, water hammer effects, and es-
pecially, operator error, where consequences of failure can be 
widespread, and where it is difficult to establish an adequate 
statistical basis for "complete system" failure rates. 
Assumption Failure rates are reasonably constant, and adequate data can be 
obtained using reliability data base services. 
This is a problem especially for process plant, where special 
reliability tests are impossible, and where such tests would 
be irrelevant in any ease, because of variations in plant con-
ditions. 
To illustrate this problem, fig. 2 shows a table of various 
causes of failure, again drawn from nuclear reactor abnormal 
Problem 
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occurrence reports. Particularly as far as design and maintenance 
errors are concerned, there are large variations from plant to 
plant. These variations inevitably lead to variations in failure 
rate from plant to plant. 
One obvious solution is to increase the quantity of failure rate 
data available, discriminating different stress factors, quality 
control factors, and perhaps, design quality factors. This solu-
tion takes time. 
An alternative, at the design stage, is to treat failure rates 
as random variables, fitting a distribution to the variation of 
failure rates observed in different situations in practice. Fig. 3 
shows an example fitting a log-normal distribution to failure 
rate data drawn from different types of data base. Then, instead 
of calculating a single reliability value for a system, a dis-
tribution of probability values is calculated. 
In many cases, it is not necessary to calculate exact reliability 
values. It is often possible to decide between two alternative 
equipment designs, by using limiting values for failure rates 
(if solution A is better than B, both when failure rates are 
high and when they are low, then solution A is chosen). Sensi-
tivity analysis can be used to discover those cases in which vari-
ation in failure rates is important. 
Separate failures are independent, so tbat the probability of 
a double failure can be calculated by taking the product of 
single failure probabilities. 
The assumption is often untrue in practice, because several 
failures occur simultaneously, as a result of a single cause. 
Such failures can be called coupled failures. There are many 
possible causes, and many failure types (fig. "»). If such coupled 
failures prevent an entire subsystem, such as a safety system, 
from working, they may be called common mode failure«. Coupled 
failures are »specially common when there are several components 
of the same type in a system. fig. 5 shows some the numbers of 
•ash failures for some component types, compared with the number 
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of single failures, in a sample of abnormal occurrence reports. 
Solutions The first step in a solution to this proble« is to identify 
the areas where such coupled failures are possible. 
By extending failure aode and effects analysis, assuming sim-
ultaneous failures in similar components, and checking for com-
mon dependency on such things as power supply, it is possible 
to discover those most of the areas where coupled failure is 
important. By further analysing specific "vide spread1* failure 
effects such as flooding, power supply overvoltage, fire« missile 
effects, water hammer, loss of ventilation etc., it is possible 
to identify most of the remaining possibilities* 
Calculation of probabilities for such coupled failures is more 
difficult. 
One can use 
1) bounding techniques. The probability of coupled failure must 
be less than the probability of a single failure. 
2) joint sampling from a distribution of failure rates. This 
means that one treats a hazard rate itself as a random 
variable with a certain distribution (for example uniform, 
normal, or log normal, centred around an average hazard rate 
for the particular component type). Then if two components 
are at risk, failure rates can be assigned to the two components 
jointly, so that in the part of the distribution where one 
component is'igood", the other component is also "good". When 
one component is "bad" the other component is also "bad". In 
this way one obtains a wider range of probabilities for the 
double failure. 
3) The probability of double failure can be calculated from 
experience of component behaviour, by collecting mch data 
in addition to the usual single failure data. Ibis approach 
requires more experience and data than for "independent 
failure" reliability calculations, but in the cases where 
coupled failure is common, it appears that this approach 
say be successful. 
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